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The Unconvincing Case Against Private Prisons 
__________________________ 
 
Jerome Hall Lecture 
 
October 23, 2013 
 
Malcolm M. Feeley* 
In 2009, the Israeli High Court of Justice held that private prisons are 
unconstitutional. This was more than a domestic constitutional issue. The court 
anchored its decision in a carefully reasoned opinion arguing that the state has a 
monopoly on the administration of punishment, and thus private prisons violate 
basic principles of modern democratic governance. This position was immediately 
elaborated upon by a number of leading legal philosophers, and the expanded 
argument has reverberated among legal philosophers, global constitutionalists, 
and public officials around the world. Private prisons are a global phenomenon, 
and this argument now stands as the definitive principled statement opposing them. 
In this Article, I argue that the state monopoly theory against privatization is 
fundamentally flawed. The Article challenges the historical record and philosophy 
of the state on which the theory is based, and then explores two other issues the 
theory wholly ignores: private custodial arrangements in other settings that are 
widely regarded as acceptable if not exemplary and third-party state arrangements 
that are universally hailed as exemplary. The Article presents first-of-its-kind 
empirical data on private prisons in Australia, discusses the implications of readily 
available information on juvenile facilities, and explores interstate compacts on 
prisoner transfers. The Article maintains that the state monopoly theory 
erroneously asserts that privatization is inconsistent with the modern state, and 
concludes with a call for policymakers and judges to imbue their future 
privatization decisions with local knowledge and time-honored pragmatism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early 2000s, Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, authorized the establishment 
of an 800-bed private prison and selected a contractor who immediately began to 
build the prison. Opponents promptly filed suit with the Supreme Court of Israel, 
sitting as the High Court of Justice (HCJ), challenging the constitutionality of the 
legislation. The HCJ took over five years to decide the case, no doubt hoping that 
the government would get the hint and assume control of the prison so that it would 
not have to decide the matter. Eventually, however, in Academic Center of Law and 
Business v. Minister of Finance,1 the court issued a sweeping ruling on the merits, 
holding that the private prison that had been constructed, but was not yet open, 
violated provisions in the state’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.2  
Punishment, the court reasoned, is a core function of the state and cannot be 
delegated to agents acting on its behalf.3 In developing its argument, the court 
articulated a state monopoly theory of punishment—punishment can only be 
administered by the state that sentences the offender, so private prisons are 
impermissible. The court’s decision is anchored in provisions in Israeli 
constitutional law protecting human dignity and liberty,4 but its opinion proclaimed 
a theory of universal applicability. The expansive decision has its origins in an un-
amendable provision in the post-war German Constitution adopted in 1949 in the 
aftermath of the destruction of the Jews by the Nazi regime.5 Since then, this 
provision has influenced constitutional scholars around the world, perhaps most 
fully in the construction of the 1992 Israeli Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 
which provides in part that “[t]here shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity 
of any person as such.”6 The concept has also been embraced by courts throughout 
Europe, especially the European Court of Human Rights,7 and more recently in 
American constitutional jurisprudence. In the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, has introduced the concept in two same-sex 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin., 
27, 68−71 [2009] (Isr.) (observing that the “power of imprisonment and the other invasive 
powers that derive from it are therefore some of the state’s most distinctive powers as the 
embodiment of government” and concluding that privatization violates “the constitutional 
right to personal liberty”), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39
/05026050.n39.htm. 
 2. Id. at 58 (quoting Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 
p. 60, § 5 (Isr.)). 
 3. Id. at 40 (“[T]he government does not stop acting as ‘the executive branch of the 
state’ when it carries out its functions through private entities or delegates certain powers to 
them.”). 
 4. See Barak Medina, Constitutional Limits to Privatization: The Israeli Supreme 
Court Decision to Invalidate Prison Privatization, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 690 (2010).  
 5. GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) (German Basic Law provision that human 
dignity is “inviolable”). 
 6. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 p. 60, § 2 (Isr.). 
 7. See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning 
the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights 
Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (1986).  
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rights landmark cases: Lawrence v. Texas8 and United States v. Windsor.9 Justice 
Kennedy also squarely invoked the concept of human dignity in Brown v. Plata,10 
in which the Court upheld a special three-judge lower-court order to reduce 
California’s prison population by 40,000 inmates in order to reduce 
unconstitutional levels of overcrowding.11  
With the 2009 Israeli court decision, the principle of human dignity and the 
issue of privatization are now firmly linked as global issues. By engaging directly 
with the themes of human dignity and privatization, which feature prominently in 
the work of scholars such as Alfred Aman,12 Academic Center energized the 
emerging global constitutional community, including Judith Resnik13 and 
Alexander Volokh.14 The opinion sheds important critical insight on the theory and 
practice of prison privatization in the United States and elsewhere. 
This Article assesses the state monopoly theory set out by the Israeli high court 
and elaborated upon by the Israeli legal theorist Alon Harel and colleagues,15 who 
were engaged with the issues as the case developed, and whose writings elaborate 
on the court’s theory. As a body, this work—the court’s opinion and articles by 
Harel and colleagues—represents the strongest theoretical statement against private 
prisons with which I am familiar. Unlike most discussions of privatization, it does 
not hinge upon a preordained conclusion based upon pretheoretical assumptions, as 
do some communitarian theories on one hand,16 and some libertarian theories on 
the other.17 Nor is it purely a high rhetorical argument or call to action.18 Nor is it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas statute outlawing same sex intercourse). 
 9. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (finding a critical section of the Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
 10. 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Mark A.R. Kleiman & Kelsey R. Hollander, Reducing Crime by Shrinking 
the Prison Headcount, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 89, 90 (2011). 
 12. See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective 
on Current Regulatory Reforms: Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in 
Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477 (2001). 
 13. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and 
Statization: Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 
162, 165–67 (2013).  
 14. See Alexander Volokh, Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor 
Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 136–38 (2012). 
 15. See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, The Case Against Privatization, 41 PHIL. 
& PUB. AFF. 67 (2013); Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The 
Case Against Privately Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113 (2008); Alon Harel & 
Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for Law and 
Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749 (2011).  
 16. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY (1983) (presenting leading defense of communitarian philosophy); see also 
Michael Walzer, Hold the Justice, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 8, 1985, at 10. 
 17. See Volokh, supra note 14. 
 18. See, e.g., John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Duty to Govern: A Critical Perspective on the 
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simply one more elaborate cost-benefit analysis.19 Rather, the approach taken in the 
court’s opinion and the articles by Alon Harel and colleagues is securely anchored 
in a traditional approach in political theory. These arguments operate through the 
implications of commonly held ideas in modern political theory about the nature of 
the state and the nature of delegation of state functions.20 
Thus, Academic Center represents a court leveraging a great intellectual 
tradition in an effort to grapple with a pressing social issue, and the result is a 
powerful, principled argument in defense of the state’s monopoly of punishment. 
The many issues surrounding private prisons were “in the air” and widely discussed 
for several years before the court’s long-awaited decision was finally handed down, 
and the opinion’s rationale did nothing but further intensify the conversation. 
Reaction to the court’s decision has been swift and immediate, and has influenced 
scholars working on private prisons in the United States and abroad.21 Some 
reaction came, even before the court handed down its opinion, as the parties 
developed their positions. Hebrew University legal philosopher Alon Harel, who 
was familiar with the arguments of the parties, wrote two articles, one by himself 
and another with Tel Aviv University legal theorist Ariel Porat, elaborating on the 
argument that Chief Justice Dorit Beinisch adopted for the court.22 This was 
followed by a third article, coauthored with Avihay Dorfman, The Case Against 
Privatization.23 The court’s opinion, together with the arguments of Harel and his 
colleagues, now stands as the definitive case against privatization, and anyone 
wishing to defend private prisons must address it head-on.  
The purpose of this Article is to do just that—to challenge the theory head on. I 
maintain that although this seemingly impregnable argument may establish a strong 
presumption against privatization, it does not establish a convincing case for the 
state monopoly theory it advances. Working in the same theoretical tradition as the 
court and Harel and colleagues, I challenge the argument on its own terms, and 
uncover far too many unacceptable consequences, anomalies, and inconsistencies 
in the theory to allow it to stand as an impregnable defense. First, I will set out the 
court’s theory, supplemented by the elaboration offered by Harel and colleagues. 
Then I will explore the weaknesses in the argument, which require it to be 
substantially curtailed or abandoned altogether and replaced by a pragmatic 
assessment of privatization—an alternative I sketch out in the conclusion. 
                                                                                                                 
Private Management of Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
155, 175–76 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990). 
 19. See Patrick Bayer & David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional 
Facilities: Public Versus Private Management, 48 J.L. & ECON. 549 (2005); Darrin Grimsey 
& Mervyn K. Lewis, Are Public Private Partnerships Value for Money? Evaluating 
Alternative Approaches and Comparing Academic and Practitioner Views, 29 ACCT. F. 345 
(2005); Stephen King & Rohan Pitchford, Privatisation in Australia: Understanding the 
Incentives in Public and Private Firms, 31 AUSTL. ECON. REV. 313 (1998). 
 20. The approach echoes ideas contained in the work of another serious liberal theorist 
of prisons, Sharon Dolovich. E.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 
55 DUKE L.J. 437 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 13; Volokh, supra note 14. 
 22. Harel, supra note 15; Harel & Porat, supra note 15. 
 23. Dorfman & Harel, supra note 15. 
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The centerpiece of Academic Center is the declaration that private prisons 
violate Israel’s Basic Law on human dignity and liberty. By making that 
declaration, the court developed a state monopoly theory that, by extension, is 
applicable to all liberal democratic governments. The court’s decision had 
immediate impact nationally; the state purchased and now operates the prison. The 
ruling has also elicited reaction from constitutional law scholars,24 political 
theorists,25 and prison experts26 around the world, and has rekindled the ongoing 
debate not only about prison privatization but also about the nature of the state and 
the nondelegation doctrine.  
I review the state monopoly theory below, as advanced by the court and 
academic articles. To be sure, there are places, primarily around the margins, where 
the court’s and the scholarly arguments diverge. Yet the two approaches are 
grounded on a common core set of commitments—namely, about the nature of the 
administration of punishment and the functions of the state. Both commitments, I 
will show, pay insufficient attention to particularized considerations of history, 
bureaucratic administration, and contemporary theories of the liberal state. And it is 
in these commitments that the state monopoly theory goes wrong.  
I. THE HIGH COURT’S THEORY OF PRIVATIZATION 
In her long and carefully constructed opinion, the Court President, Justice Dorit 
Beinisch raises and rejects various arguments in favor of prison privatization and, 
in a tour de force analysis that draws on classical liberal political thought, develops 
an argument that the state—and only the state—must shoulder responsibility for 
administering the punishments that it orders. Although she anchors her opinion to 
the concepts of human dignity and liberty, the strength of the opinion is to set out 
the implications of punishment in light of modern democratic theories of the state. 
Delegating the administration of prisons to private agents, the court insists, not only 
violates the dignity of the convicted offender but also inflicts “an additional 
independent violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty beyond the 
violation that arises from the imprisonment itself.”27 The opinion continues:  
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See, e.g., Medina, supra note 4; see also Amnon Reichman, Judicial Constitution 
Making in a Divided Society: The Israeli Case, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES 
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 233 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds., 2013); Daphne Barak-Erez, The 
Private Prison Controversy and the Privatization Continuum, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 
138 (2011).  
 25. See, e.g., Dorfman & Harel, supra note 15 (responding indirectly to themes 
broached in Academic Center); Resnik, supra note 13; François Tanguay-Renaud, 
Criminalizing the State, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 255 (2013) (responding indirectly to themes 
broached in Academic Center). 
 26. See, e.g., Richard Harding, State Monopoly of ‘Permitted Violation of Human 
Rights’: The Decision of the Supreme Court of Israel Prohibiting the Private Operation and 
Management of Prisons, 14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131 (2012); Doron Shultziner & Itai 
Rabinovici, Human Dignity, Self-Worth, and Humiliation: A Comparative Legal–
Psychological Approach, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 105 (2012). 
 27. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. 
27, 73 [2009] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39
/05026050.n39.pdf. 
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It can therefore be said that our position is that the scope of the 
violation of a prison inmate’s constitutional right to personal liberty, 
when the entity responsible for his imprisonment is a private 
corporation motivated by economic considerations of profit and loss, is 
inherently greater than the violation of the same right of an inmate 
when the entity responsible for his imprisonment is a government 
authority that is not motivated by those considerations, even if the term 
of imprisonment that these two inmates serve is identical and even if 
the violation of the human rights that actually takes place behind the 
walls of each of the two prisons where they serve their sentences is 
identical.28  
This conclusion rests on an elaborate argument about the nature of the modern 
liberal state. Prison administration is a core state function, the court reasons, and 
this function cannot be delegated without undermining the democratic contract, 
state sovereignty, and the dignity and liberty of its citizens. Drawing on theorists 
ranging from Hobbes to Locke to Michael Walzer, the court develops an elegant 
pair of arguments that both lead to the same conclusion.29 To delegate core state 
functions to third party contractors undermines the integrity and legitimacy—the 
very sovereignty—of the state. Echoing the categorical language of Kant, the court 
insists that even if it found that private prison administration was kinder and gentler 
than public prison administration, such a delegation would still violate an inmate’s 
dignity and liberty and as well subvert the state’s sovereignty.30 
There is another less obvious but nevertheless crucial feature of the court’s 
opinion. In its discussion of the theory of nondelegable core state functions, the 
court repeatedly characterizes the contractual entity as “a private corporation 
motivated by economic considerations,” and most importantly those of “profit” and 
loss.31 The court maintains that employees of such companies are not able to put 
concern for prisoners above concern for profits. Yet, a careful reading of the 
opinion shows that the argument hinges on a related but different factor. While a 
private for-profit corporation may be a particularly offensive contracting agent, the 
court’s decision rests upon the nature of a state’s core responsibilities. Only the 
state that has the authority to impose punishments has the authority to administer 
those punishments. There can be no substitutes, writes Justice Beinisch, since “one 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. at 55–64. 
 30.  
[W]e are prepared to assume in favour of the state and the concessionaire that 
the method of operating prisons adopted in amendment 28 will lead to greater 
economic and administrative efficiency than the methods indicated by the 
petitioners. But when we balance the violation of the human rights of prison 
inmates as a result of their being imprisoned in a privately managed prison that 
operates in the format set out in amendment 28 against the realization of the 
purpose of improving prison conditions while achieving greater economic and 
administrative efficiency, the constitutional rights to personal liberty and 
human dignity are of greater weight. 
Id. at 95. 
 31. Id. at 72−73, 75−76. 
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of the main factors that led to the organization of human beings in society, whereby 
invasive powers—including the power to send convicted offenders to prison—were 
given to the authorities of that society and especially to the law enforcement 
authorities . . . .”32 In effect, the court constructs a strong state monopoly theory. 
This position, Justice Beinisch continues, is supported by both the history of the 
liberal state and major political theorists, including Thomas Hobbes, who 
maintained that “Publique Ministers are also all those, that have Authority from the 
Soveraign, to . . . apprehend, and imprison Malefactors . . . .”33 It is, thus, the 
“state’s function to administer punishments.”34 She attributes this same view to 
John Locke,35 who argued that “no Political Society can be, nor subsist without 
having in it self the Power to preserve the Property, and in order thereunto, punish 
the Offences of all those of that society . . . .”36 Substituting “Community” for 
Hobbes’s “Sovereign,” Locke continues, asserting that “[m]en having Authority 
from the Community . . . decide[] all the differences that may happen between any 
Members of that Society, concerning any matter of right; and punishes those 
Offences, which any Member hath committed against the Society . . . .”37 Summing 
up the lessons of Hobbes and Locke, the court concludes:  
Although, naturally, many changes and developments have occurred 
since the seventeenth century in the way in which the nature and 
functions of the state are regarded, it would appear that the basic 
political principle that the state, through the various bodies acting in it, 
is responsible for public security and the enforcement of the criminal 
law has remained unchanged throughout all those years, and it is a part 
of the social contract on which the modern democratic state is also 
based.38  
Justice Beinisch reinforces these views of classical political thinkers with those of 
contemporary legal and political theorists. She cites approvingly from an opinion 
written by Israeli Supreme Court Justice Itzhak Zamir, who argued in Conterm Ltd. 
v. Finance Ministry, a significant human rights decision in its own right, that “[i]t is 
desirable, indeed, necessary, that the relationship between the administration and 
the public [is] a reciprocal relationship of give-and-take.”39 The court also quotes 
the view of American political scientist John Dilulio approvingly: “[T]he 
formulation and administration of criminal laws by recognized public authorities is 
one of the liberal state’s most central and historic functions; indeed, in some 
formulations, it is the liberal state’s reason for being.”40  
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Id. at 61. 
 33. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 169 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. 
student ed.1996) (1651). 
 34. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. at 61. 
 35. Id. at 61−62. 
 36. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT § 87 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 37. Id. 
 38. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. at 62. 
 39. HCJ 164/97 Conterm Ltd v. Fin. Ministry, 14 Isr. L. Rep. 1, 34 (1998) (Isr.). 
 40. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. at 27, 63 (quoting DiIulio, supra note 18, at 175). 
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Chief Justice Beinisch concludes that the state has a monopoly—through the 
executive branch and its “instrumentalities” (not agents!)—with respect to the use 
of organized force, including the administration of imprisonment.41 This monopoly 
is required for two reasons. First, “[w]ere this force not exercised by the competent 
organs of the state, in accordance with the powers given to them and in order to 
further the general public interest rather than a private interest, this use of force 
would not have democratic legitimacy . . . .”42 Second,  
[t]he fact that the organized force is exercised by a body that acts 
through the state and is subject to the laws and norms that apply to 
anyone who acts through the organs of the state and also to the civil 
service ethos in the broad sense of this term is capable of significantly 
reducing the danger that the considerable power given to those bodies 
will be abused . . . .43  
In sum, the state through its instrumentalities and no other institution has 
exclusive moral authority both to impose and to administer criminal sanctions. To 
maintain its integrity, it must perform its own difficult chores. Once again Justice 
Beinisch quotes DiIulio:  
[T]o continue to be legitimate and morally significant, the authority to 
govern those behind bars, to deprive citizens of their liberty, to coerce 
(and even kill) them, must remain in the hands of government 
authorities. . . . The administration of prisons and jails involves the 
legally sanctioned coercion of some citizens by others. This coercion is 
exercised in the name of the offended public.44 
Review the language in the last several paragraphs. The court begins by 
focusing on the indignity of punishments inflicted by corporations concerned with 
profits and the additional increment of liberty that is lost when this occurs. But then 
it shifts its concern to the integrity of the state. The state fails in one of its essential 
duties if it does not through its own organs or instrumentalities perform these core 
functions. Justice Beinisch’s indignation may have been sparked by the idea of 
for-profit prisons, but her decision rests squarely on the belief that the state and 
only the state has the authority to administer punishment to those it has convicted 
and sentenced. It is a dereliction of the state’s duty to shunt this responsibility off to 
any other institution. It cannot delegate this responsibility to a for-profit agent, or 
any other agent. Only the state may sanction. This holds, she insists, even if the 
agent provides better care and lowers the propensity for inmates to reoffend.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. at 61−64. 
 42. Id. at 65. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (quoting DiIulio, supra note 18, at 173). 
 45.  
The independent violation of the constitutional right to personal liberty of 
inmates in a privately managed prison exists even if we assume that from a 
factual-empirical viewpoint it has not been proved that inmates in that prison 
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Although she does not address it directly, this holds even if the responsibility, the 
liability, and the standard of care required of the contracting agent equals or 
presumably even exceeds that required of the public instrumentality. According to 
the logic of the opinion, the rights violation that a prisoner in a private facility 
suffers is entirely independent of the quality of the care he receives; the rights 
violation stems, rather, from the identity of the prison administrator. It is a strong 
state monopoly theory that knows no exceptions. To Justice Beinisch, this 
monopoly is required for the “reciprocal relationship” that is essential for citizen 
and state set forth in Justice Zamir’s observation from Conterm quoted above. We 
will return to this concern shortly.  
In his 2008 article, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions,46 Harel 
anticipates the court’s argument closely, though, as befits a philosopher, with 
greater formality. He, too, finds private prisons to be undignified, and goes on to 
argue that the power to administer punishments is one of the state’s core functions 
that cannot be delegated to an agent. The responsibility for administering the 
punishment must rest directly on the state. Furthermore, he insists what holds for 
imprisonment applies equally to other forms of criminal law sanctioning, such as 
probation, since his argument is aimed at the delegation of sanctions as such, 
whether they be imprisonment, probation, or shaming.47 Unlike the court, Harel 
does not rehearse classical political theories in order to explicate the nature of the 
state, its powers of delegation, and the nature of criminal punishment. Instead, in 
the tradition of ordinary language philosophy,48 he appeals to our intuitions about 
the state and about punishment, and then constructs his theory around them. But 
Harel’s conclusion is identical with that of the court: under no circumstances may 
the state delegate its core function of managing and operating prisons to private 
actors.49 The state, and no other institution, must administer the punishments it 
imposes. 
To arrive at this conclusion, Harel takes the reader through a set of carefully 
reasoned arguments in which he considers and rejects several possible forms of 
                                                                                                                 
will suffer worse physical conditions and invasive measures than those in the 
public prisons. 
HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. at 69−71. 
 46. Harel, supra note 15. 
 47. Id. at 114 (“Delegating the power to determine the nature and severity of the 
criminal sanctions (e.g., by using shaming penalties) or delegating the power to inflict 
criminal sanctions to private entities (e.g., by establishing private prisons) severs the link 
between the state’s judgments concerning the wrongfulness of the act and the determination 
of the severity of the sanction or the infliction of the sanction.”). 
 48. See, e.g., PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE (Charles E. Caton ed., 1963) 
(setting out core tenets of the ordinary language approach to philosophical inquiry). 
 49. Harel, supra note 15, at 132–33 (“The infliction of state-initiated privately inflicted 
sanctions is impermissible. It is impermissible on the part of a citizen to inflict sanctions 
without forming an independent judgment concerning the wrongfulness of the alleged 
wrongful act. When such a private judgment has been formed, it is impermissible on the part 
of the state to approve of the infliction of the punishment, since such an approval gives 
undue weight to the private moral convictions of the individual who inflicts the sanction.”). 
Observe that it might seem puzzling at first that Harel focuses on a private judgment, not that 
of a public court. This is precisely Harel’s point (or, at least one of his points): we tend to 
think of punishment as involving purely public judgments.  
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publically administered sanctions, and then seizes on one, which he terms 
“integrationist state-inflicted sanctions.”50 He explains it by way of a vivid analogy. 
In a family, parents stand in a unique relation to their children. One manifestation 
of this relationship is parents’ unique authority to punish their children in situations 
that are not criminal, and are distinctly familial—for failing to be polite, failing to 
say their prayers in the evening, failing to do their chores, and the like. It is, Harel 
argues, difficult to imagine anyone other than parents sanctioning children for such 
breaches of familial norms.51 Allowing others such powers, he convinces us, 
jeopardizes the very idea of the family. In an odd but nevertheless important way, 
this unique parental authority is one of the features that make a family a family. 
Delegating this responsibility to third parties undermines the very meaning of 
family.  
Harel argues that an offender’s relationship to the state, at least with respect to 
punishment, is analogous to that of a child’s relationship to a parent. No other 
institution can substitute for the state without breaking the bond between offender 
and state. “To conclude,” he writes,  
the integrationist argument maintains that the power to issue 
prohibitions and the powers to make determinations concerning the 
severity of the sanctions and to inflict them are inextricably 
interrelated. . . . By privatizing the infliction of the sanction, the state 
effectively not merely transfers the ‘technical’ power to execute the 
sanction; instead, it strips itself of the power to make binding 
determinations concerning the wrongfulness of the act and the 
appropriateness of the sanction. . . . By delegating this power to private 
individuals, the state in effect severs the link between the prohibitions it 
issues and the suffering inflicted on the offender.52  
In an elaboration on this argument, Avihay Dorfman and Harel argue that in 
cases involving “inherently public goods,” such as the provision of prisons, 
“execution by public officials [is] necessary.”53 Unlike Alexander Volokh, who 
suggests that there are no “inherent” or normatively relevant distinctions between 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Id. at 123 (“Under an integrationist justification, . . . . [t]he power to inflict criminal 
sanctions as well as the power to determine their severity is inextricably linked with the 
power to issue prohibitions whose violations call for punitive measures. The power to inflict 
sanctions has to be a state power because of the interdependence between the state’s power 
to issue prohibitions and the power to determine the severity of these sanctions and inflict 
sanctions triggered by violating these prohibitions.”).  
 51. Dorfman & Harel, supra note 15, at 92 n.41. 
 52. Harel, supra note 15, at 130 (emphasis added). 
 53. Dorfman & Harel, supra note 15, at 91. It is interesting to contrast Dorfman and 
Harel’s theory with Rawls’s idea of public reason. Public reason is Rawls’s response to the 
problem of deep disagreement. Democratic majorities can rightly impose their wills only if 
their policies can be explicated in terms acceptable to all (even if those terms are not why the 
majorities themselves endorse the policies). See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
212−54 (1993). If this is the standard by which policy is judged, it might well be that private 
prisons can be justified in terms that almost everyone can accept or endorse. We might 
wonder whether such an argument would extend to goods like public schools.  
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public employees and public contractors,54 Dorfman and Harel advance a 
categorical argument that “two conditions . . . must be fulfilled for a person to be a 
public official . . . .”55 Together, these conditions boil down to the idea that an 
agent of the state must make his or her decisions about state policy only in light of 
the general public’s interests, and these decisions must only be a product of 
reasoning conducted among like-minded, public-spirited officials. The private 
provision of prisons fails to meet these criteria. And, since “the ability to speak and 
act in the name of the state is crucial for justifying a violent act (say, that of 
incarcerating a person . . .). It is necessary for the punishment to communicate a 
judgment of the state . . . .”56  
In sum, both the state monopoly theory set forth in Academic Center and the 
integrationist theory advanced by Harel and elaborated on by Dorfman and Harel 
are stated in categorical and universal terms that seem to allow no exception. That 
is, the state and only the state may impose criminal punishments and that same state 
and only that state may administer them. This responsibility may not be delegated 
to agents not employed by the state. It is a theory of state monopoly. As such, it 
rests upon an ontological argument about the nature of the state, in sharp contrast to 
the great bulk of other oppositional arguments, which rest upon implicit or explicit 
utilitarian comparisons, fears that employees of corporations will put profits ahead 
of persons, or worries that the scope of liability will be less with public contractors 
than government employees.57 As Volokh shows, these are certainly legitimate 
concerns, but there is nothing in the private/public division that would preclude 
imposing on private actors the same standards that are required of public 
employees.58 But to the court and to Harel and his collaborators, while these 
considerations are important, they are not essential. Even if private actors were held 
to higher standards and those standards were enforced, the democratic contract 
would be violated and state sovereignty compromised. As I said, the court and 
Harel and colleagues have presented a strong state monopoly theory.  
II. THE HISTORY AND SCOPE OF STATE ACTION CONCERNING PUNISHMENT 
Now that I have outlined the theory advanced by the court and by the major 
legal theorists who have addressed the issue, I want to provisionally accept their 
conclusions, and undertake a form of reverse engineering. Instead of drawing on 
our pretheoretical intuitions about the nature of punishment and the nature of the 
modern state in the manner of Harel and colleagues in order to see where they take 
us with respect to private prisons, I want to examine several common and widely 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Volokh, supra note 14, at 144.  
 55. Dorfman & Harel, supra note 15, at 89. 
 56. Id. at 94. 
 57. See Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense: 
Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257 (1991); John Hall, Private 
Opportunity, Public Benefit?, 19 FISCAL STUD. 121 (1998). But cf. Dolovich, supra note 20; 
Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128 (Jody Freeman & Martha 
Minow eds., 2009). 
 58. Volokh, supra note 14, at 156–57. 
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accepted arrangements that neither the Israeli High Court of Justice nor the 
philosophers considered when constructing their argument. These practices, I will 
argue, elicit intuitions that conflict with the state monopolist theory. If this is the 
case, and I will show that it is, my question is this: What do our intuitions about 
these other practices tell us about the theory? Which should give way—the theory, 
or the practices and our intuitions about them? 
My discussion addresses four issues that are either incorrectly dealt with or 
ignored entirely by the court and the philosophers’ elaborations. They are: the 
problem of lawyer’s history, the failure to confront contemporary theories of the 
modern state, the failure to address our intuitions about other prosaic forms of 
privatization, and the neglect of other state-based forms of punishment that run 
afoul of the theory. Individually these issues raise significant challenges to the state 
monopoly theory of punishment. Taken together, they may be devastating.  
A. Lawyer’s History 
Before turning to an examination of the central concern, there are two 
preliminary issues to dispense with. First, let’s start with easy prey, the “lawyer’s 
history” that informs the court’s decision. As noted earlier, the court asserts that an 
essential feature of the (liberal) state is and has always been (and should always be) 
that the state and no other institution should exercise the power to administer 
criminal punishment. The court anchors this view in the writings of Thomas 
Hobbes and carries it through to the views of Michael Walzer.59  
As history, this is questionable at best. Sources revealing the contrary are so 
numerous and the evidence so overwhelming that one does not know where to 
begin in pointing out the shortcomings of the court’s history lesson.60 At the times 
that Hobbes and Locke wrote, England lacked even rudimentary administrative 
capacities.61 Well into the nineteenth century, the protoliberal English state 
                                                                                                                 
 
 59. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. 27, 
55, 61−63 [2009] (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/05/050/026/n39
/05026050.n39.pdf (citing HOBBES, supra note 33; Walzer, Hold the Justice, supra note 16). 
 60. For a general treatment of the development of the state and its rudimentary 
capacities, see generally THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 
(Charles Tilly ed., 1975); JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE 
ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783 (1988); GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MODERN STATE: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION (1978); V.G. Kiernan, State and Nation in 
Western Europe, 31 PAST & PRESENT 20 (1965). 
 61. BREWER, supra note 60, at 65 (stating that in a “comprehensive study of the 
Interregnum government service . . . only about 1200 officials of state serving in the eleven 
years between 1649 and 1660” were identified). Brewer provides detailed figures of the 
number of administrative employees in the period from 1690 to 1782. Id. at 66–67; see also 
CLIVE HOLMES, SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY LINCOLNSHIRE (Maurice Barley ed., 1980) 
(detailing the importance of local figures to the English state); Michael Braddick, State 
Formation and Social Change in Early Modern England: A Problem Stated and Approaches 
Suggested, 16 SOC. HIST. 1, 2 (1991) (“[I]n the case of seventeenth-century England, the 
state was not bureaucratized. Central government depended on the co-operation of unpaid 
local officials, and these local brokers of central authority acted as mediators between central 
government and the locality.”).  
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depended heavily on private contractors to maintain custody of prisoners, and to 
administer punishments.62 In fifteenth- to nineteenth-century England, basements in 
ale houses were used as jails to house prisoners awaiting trial, and their keepers 
were compensated by a combination of fees paid by the county and payments from 
families of those accused.63 Indeed, in early modern England and until much later, 
the hangman was a contractor who was compensated on a per-neck basis.64 
Beginning in the early seventeenth century and continuing up until the American 
Revolution, transportation of convicted felons was operated exclusively by 
contractors who derived their income from auctioning off their human cargo into 
limited term slavery from the decks of their boats moored in Chesapeake Bay.65 
The Australian version of transportation that emerged after the American War of 
Independence put an end to North American transportation and combined both state 
and private actors in a more complicated system of transportation and servitude but 
remained heavily dependent upon private contractors.66 Similar arrangements 
obtained in early modern Europe as well.67  
A very effective system of probation and what in contemporary terms might be 
termed pretrial diversion also depended heavily on private parties to oversee 
offenders in England from the fifteenth century well into the nineteenth century, 
and in the United States well into the twentieth century.68 Both recognizance for 
good behavior and recognizances to keep the peace required private parties not 
related to the accused to pledge bonds that were to be forfeited if the accused 
violated the conditions for good behavior or peace specified by the court. In 
essence, the accused had to arrange for his own parole officers, who, in turn, had 
substantial powers over him and who stood to lose a great deal of money if the 
offender violated the agreement.69  
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. For a digestible treatment of the English administrative state up through the 
mid-nineteenth century, see David Roberts, Jeremy Bentham and the Victorian 
Administrative State, 2 VICTORIAN STUD. 193 (1959).  
 63. JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF THE PRISONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 270 (1792). 
 64. See generally Edward J. Henderson, Liability to Employees of Independent 
Contractors Engaged in Inherently Dangerous Work: A Workable Workers’ Compensation 
Proposal, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1165 (1980) (showing prevalence of independent contractors 
in early modern England). And, if further compensation was required, upon the death of the 
hanged man, the clothes of the dead apparently became property of the hangman, at least 
according to some historians. See FRANK MCLYNN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 271 (1989). 
 65. See Malcolm M. Feeley, The Privatization of Punishment in Historical Perspective, 
in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 199, 205–07 (William T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991). 
 66. See ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE 61–67 (1986); see also DAVID NEAL, THE 
RULE OF LAW IN A PENAL COLONY: LAW AND POWER IN EARLY NEW SOUTH WALES (1991); 
Malcolm M. Feeley, Entrepreneurs of Punishment: The Legacy of Privatization, 4 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321 (2002). 
 67. Pieter Spierenburg, From Amsterdam to Auburn: An Explanation for the Rise of the 
Prison in Seventeenth-Century Holland and Nineteenth-Century America, 20 J. SOC. HIST. 
439, 440–48 (1987). 
 68. See, e.g., JOEL SAMAHA, LAW AND ORDER IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF 
ELIZABETHAN ESSEX (1974). 
 69. Id. at 76–77. 
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The idea of the modern prison for mass incarceration was in many respects 
invented by Jeremy Bentham.70 His design for Panopticon is well known;71 what is 
less well known is that he sought to obtain exclusive rights to operate English 
prisons from which he expected to reap windfall profits through the use of their 
labor.72 Bentham failed in his obsessive effort, but his idea of the profit-based 
prison took root in America.73 More generally, the modern liberal Anglo-American 
criminal justice system has many of its roots in private, for-profit efforts that led to 
innovations of all sorts: fee-based law enforcement, prosecution societies, legal aid 
schemes for private prosecutors, and the like.74 
So, whatever precisely history reveals, it does not teach us that the English and 
American states have long histories of insisting upon a monopoly of 
state-administered punishments. Indeed, it reveals the reverse. Historically, 
Anglo-American countries have depended heavily on the private administration of 
public punishments, and for many other functions of the modern liberal criminal 
justice system.  
If one goes further afield, but still within the realm of modern democratic states, 
one can find still other practices that grate upon Western sensibilities. In Japan, for 
instance, prosecutors regularly drop charges of sexual assault if the accused issues a 
formal apology accompanied by a substantial sum of money to the victim.75 This 
seems inconsistent with Western legal practice and social values; however, 
Japanese culture and more particularly many victims accept the option because it 
affords them a modicum of privacy (although the option is at times accepted 
reluctantly, and results from pressure on the female victim).76 It is a state-
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON (1791); JEREMY BENTHAM, WORKS (John Bowring 
ed., 1843). 
 71. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
200–09 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) (1975) (offering detailed account of Bentham’s 
panopticon); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 181, 185 (2008). 
 72. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, The Haunted House of Jeremy Bentham, in VICTORIAN 
MINDS 32 (1968). 
 73. RICHARD W. HARDING, PRIVATE PRISONS AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1997); 
Feeley, supra note 65; see also Dolovich, supra note 20; Lisa Belkin, Rise of Private 
Prisons: How Much of a Bargain?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1989, at A14. 
 74. Malcolm M. Feeley, Privatization and Punishment: Lessons from History, in SOCIAL 
SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE LAW 41 (Patricia Ewick et al. eds., 1999); P.J.R. King, 
Prosecution Associations and Their Impact in Eighteenth-Century Essex, in POLICING AND 
PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 1750−1850, at 171 (Douglas Hay & Francis Snyder eds., 1989); 
David Philips, Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: Associations for the 
Prosecution of Felons in England 1760−1860, in POLICING AND PROSECUTION IN BRITAIN 
1750−1850, supra, at 113. 
 75. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 
206–07 (2002) (observing that “[p]ressure [to settle] is applied most conspicuously on female 
victims in sex crime cases” and describing a case in which an alleged perpetrator sought 
settlement by offer of the equivalent of $333 USD); Setsuo Miyazawa, The Private Sector 
and Law Enforcement in Japan, in PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES, supra note 65, at 
241. 
 76. JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 207. 
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sanctioned, but not state-administered, type of punishment. Only the most 
hyperformal advocates of the state monopoly theory against privatization would try 
to use this distinction to escape this conclusion.  
B. The Disaggregated State 
A second concern, on which I will also only briefly touch, is the conception of 
the state that underlies both the court’s opinion and Harel’s analyses. Simply put, 
both the court and these legal theorists advance an early modernist vision of the 
state, both in its form and functions. The state monopoly theory envisions a unitary 
state, one that contains (or, at a minimum, is capable of containing) all of the parts 
necessary to carry out the responsibilities with which it has been tasked.77 Its 
politics are integrated, and its administrative routines are standardized.78 The 
archetype of the unitary state is, perhaps, the Westminster model, with its 
“parliamentary sovereignty, cabinet government, executive authority, and . . . 
neutral civil service.”79 This vision of the state’s form has implications for its 
functions. If the state is unitary—if, in other words, it possesses all of the resources 
required to undertake and fulfill its mission—then it need not delegate tasks outside 
of itself. The function of the unitary state, in other words, is to act, not to delegate.  
Such a view as to the form and function of the state can be found in the early 
modern texts with which Justice Beinisch is clearly fluent. Hobbes, Locke, and 
other protoliberal political theorists insist that the sovereign has ultimate 
responsibility for maintaining order, establishing crimes, specifying punishments, 
and overseeing their administration.80 Indeed, this vision of the Leviathan is in all 
likelihood Hobbes’s single greatest contribution to political philosophy. What’s 
more, the state monopolists’ implicit theory of delegation—namely, that it is 
simply not the sort of thing that states, understood in their fullest and most 
idealized sense, do—is given voice in the writings of Locke. Relying on ideas 
developed in the law of agency, Locke argued that  
[t]he Legislative cannot transfer the Power of Making Laws to any 
other hands. For it being but a delegated Power from the People, they, 
who have it, cannot pass it over to others. . . . And when the People 
have said, We will submit to rules, and be govern’d by Laws made by 
such Men, and in such Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall 
make Laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any Laws but 
such as are Enacted by those, whom they have Chosen, and Authorised 
to make Laws for them. The power of the Legislative being derived 
                                                                                                                 
 
 77. The language of unitary and disaggregated state is widely used. For a particularly 
clear treatment see DAVID HELD, GLOBAL COVENANT (2004) (categorizing various forms of 
contracted-out arrangements). 
 78. For an intellectual history of approaches to conceptualizing the state see generally 
MARK BEVIR, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE 81–82 (2010). 
 79. Id. at 82. 
 80. See, e.g., JEAN HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION (1986); 
C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO 
LOCKE (1962); BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); Russell 
Hardin, Hobbesian Political Order, 19 POL. THEORY 156 (1991). 
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from the People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no 
other, than what that positive Grant conveyed, which being only to 
make Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no 
power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it in other 
hands.81  
Public authority, Locke argues, originates with the governed through the making of 
a social contract. Unless that contractual arrangement includes a provision that 
states that the holder of public authority can further delegate the power it has been 
entrusted, any delegation is, in essence, ultra vires. It is not that Locke believes that 
delegation by officeholders inherently violates some moral ideal; rather, it is simply 
that the power to delegate is the sort of thing that must be contained in the contract. 
It is the sort of thing that must be bargained for, not assumed to exist. 
We should be clear that Locke, in the above-cited paragraph, is referring to 
delegations of the legislative, not the executive, power.82 Locke is more sanguine 
about delegations of the executive power, which is the power to “see to the 
Execution of the Laws that are made.”83 Apparently of the belief that prison 
administration is more executive function than it is legislative, Justice E.E. Levy, 
dissenting in Academic Center, cites Locke’s observation that  
[o]f other [m]inisterial and subordinate [p]owers in a [c]ommonwealth, 
we need not speak, they being so multiply’d with infinite variety, . . . 
that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all. . . . [T]hey 
have no manner of [a]uthority any of them, beyond what is, by positive 
[g]rant, and [c]omission, delegated to them . . . .84  
Locke here seems to accept if not condone the delegation of nonlegislative 
powers. If so, there is nothing in Locke’s extensive writings that would support the 
monopolists’ theory that the state can never delegate its executive powers. 
Therefore, Justice Levy concludes, “It follows that there is no fundamental 
impropriety in the idea of assigning sovereign powers under certain conditions.”85  
The difficulty with this line of thinking, however, is that it holds up only insofar 
as the power to imprison is, in fact, an executive power. This may be a difficult 
position to hold. As Michael Lipsky’s classic study, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 
reveals, much of what we might, as a formal matter, characterize as executive 
action does, in fact, produce new norms.86 Judith Resnik has suggested a similar 
point in the context of the privatization debate.87 Thus, although we might outright 
reject the court’s invocation of Locke if we were to highlight his position on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. LOCKE, supra note 36, § 141 (emphasis omitted). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at § 144 (emphasis omitted). 
 84. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law & Bus., Human Rights Div. v. Minister of Fin. 
27, 193-94 [2009] (Isr.) (Levy, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting LOCKE, supra 
note 36, § 152). 
 85. Id. at 194. 
 86. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN 
PUBLIC SERVICE (updated ed. 2010). 
 87. See Resnik, supra note 13. 
2014] THE UNCONVINCING CASE AGAINST PRIVATE PRISONS 1417 
 
delegations of executive power, the safer course is to assume that prison 
administration will involve some acts that fairly approximate the creation of 
normative standards of behavior, and thus treat the power being delegated as 
legislative in nature.  
Returning, then, to our bigger picture, we can allow that Locke’s argument 
against delegation of the legislative power is compelling, so long as one assumes 
the form of the state is unitary. But Locke’s argument as to the proper function of 
government—to act, rather than to delegate—loses much of its force if the form of 
government is not unitary. Why? If the state is disaggregated, then it is plausible to 
assume that the social contract contains a provision empowering officeholders to 
delegate powers. After all, why would rational individuals delegate power to an 
entity incapable of performing the tasks they demand if they did not believe that the 
state would redelegate its power to entities capable of fulfilling the citizenry’s 
desires?  
If the state was ever properly characterized as unitary, it is certainly not today. 
In response to the Academic Center opinion, Barak Medina questioned the court’s 
distinction between public and private actors, urging instead that we recognize a 
“continuum” between public and private roles.88 Medina observes that, under 
Israeli law, private employees of a corporation running a prison “are formally 
defined as ‘civil servants,’” and legally on par with prison guards employed by the 
state when it comes to respecting prisoners’ rights.89 Medina’s cogent analysis 
reminds us that the line between “the state” and “private society” is, at best, blurry. 
More generally, much of contemporary political theory accepts the idea of the 
disaggregated state, and thereby rejects the unitary state model.90 Conceptions of 
this disaggregated state vary widely, but they tend to be linked by an approach to 
the state that views what has traditionally been described as the sovereign will as 
merely one actor among many. The state, in the traditional Westminster sense, now 
coexists alongside a plethora of equally significant actors—some drawn from the 
private and nonprofit sectors,91 some drawn from the public sector of foreign 
governments92—each of them engaged in the policy-making process. On many 
                                                                                                                 
 
 88. Medina, supra note 4, at 709–10. 
 89. Id. at 710. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED 
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accounts of the disaggregated state, the executive, following the Westminster 
model, still exerts some control over the direction of policy in a given territorial 
space. Today, however, the extent of that control is severely limited. Whether 
seeking to induce administrative agencies that are formally part of the state to act93 
or bargaining with private sector service providers,94 the power of the executive 
seems to be akin to trying to push a rope. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, as 
Gillian Metzger argues, “[p]rivate entities provide a vast array of social services for 
the government; administer core aspects of government programs; and perform 
tasks that appear quintessentially governmental, such as promulgating standards or 
regulating third-party activities.”95  
In short, the unitary model of the state can no longer be assumed. Whereas 
Locke could perhaps rightly assume a unitary state in his analysis of the social 
contract, today we no longer can. Thus, because the form of the state has arguably 
shifted, we should be open to the idea that the functions that we assign the state 
have shifted as well. In particular, we should be open to the idea that the state now 
possesses something of a dual mandate: both to act, and to delegate. In other words, 
the monopolist argument concerning inherent functions of the state has failed to 
grapple with the fact that the theories upon which it relies were constructed in a 
milieu in which the state was unitary. Applying Locke’s theory to the state as it 
exists today may very well yield a conclusion different from the one at which the 
High Court of Justice arrives. This is not to say that we should make public policy 
today about prisons based on what Locke would have thought. It is, rather, to 
challenge the monopoly theory’s conclusion that the state has an inherent form and 
function.  
C. Counterexamples to the State Monopoly Theory 
Let me now turn to my main concern with the case against privatization. It 
emerges from consideration of an array of widely accepted practices that appear to 
violate the theory. If I properly understand the categorical argument offered by 
Justice Beinisch and Professors Harel and Dorfman, any exception to their 
argument would be fatal to their theory. At a minimum, the theory should be tested 
by hard cases—the apparent exceptions to their theory—to see how it handles 
them. Below I examine two well-regarded sets of practices that seem to run counter 
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 93. For a formal analysis of this problem, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political 
Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008). 
 94. Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1376–
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 95. Id. at 1369. Whether nontraditional actors should be considered part of “the state” is 
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others argue that the state is built on ideas. Id. 
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to the theory. The existence of these practices and their widespread acceptance, of 
course, do not imply their moral acceptability. Perhaps upon reflection we will find 
the theory convincing and these so-called exceptions wanting. Or perhaps there is a 
way to reconcile what appear to me to be exceptions to their rule. However, since 
they and others who oppose privatization have, to the best of my knowledge, failed 
to address these issues at all, these apparent exceptions should give some pause for 
reflection before we subscribe to the state monopoly theory. If my concern with 
lawyer’s history and an “outmoded conception” of the state are not enough to 
challenge the theory, perhaps these examples of exceptions will.  
First, I will show that for-profit prisons, as viewed by state monopoly theory, are 
a caricature of prisons—a not-altogether-unfair portrait, but a caricature 
nonetheless.96 I will do this by pointing to a number of private institutions that do 
not conform neatly to the image of private prisons envisioned in the theory. 
Second, and most important, I will identify several other widely accepted if not 
exemplary practices that fail to conform to the state monopoly feature of the theory 
against privatization. My use of comparisons here is to point to instances where our 
intuitions do not lead us to recoil at the idea of privatization, and where 
privatization and violations of the state monopoly theory in fact represent real 
aspirations for higher standards and more humane treatment. Further, I argue, my 
ideas are not derived from abstract theorizing but from real-world practices whose 
consequences are observable. Taken together, I maintain these factors reveal that 
the state monopoly theory against privatization does not hold water.97  
D. Privatization of Prisons in the United States and Australia 
The contemporary movement for privatization in corrections was initiated in the 
United States where, in terms of numbers, it has had its greatest impact. Many more 
adult offenders are confined in private custodial facilities in the United States than 
in any other country in the world. Yet, no more than ten percent of all adult 
offenders are held in private prisons in the United States.98 Several of the states 
with the smallest prison populations have a quarter or more of their prisoners in 
private facilities, but among the larger states the figures are below ten percent and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. For a much more extensive analysis along similar lines, see Volokh, supra note 14. 
Volokh’s carefully argued piece works through a great variety of caricatures of private 
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overcome. Id. 
 97. The counterexamples I adduce are not designed to make utilitarian comparisons of 
the sort that Sharon Dolovich considers and rejects. See Dolovich, supra note 20, at 443 n.11 
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pursue the course of action that stands to generate the best possible consequences.”). Rather, 
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 98. Gerry Gaes, Cost, Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization, NAT’L INST. 
JUSTICE (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.nij.gov/journals/259/prison-privatization.htm. 
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in many instances zero.99 Figures for jails in the United States vary widely.100 There 
are thousands of counties in the United States, and several dozen if not hundreds of 
them have contracted with private providers, so that in some smaller counties all 
inmates may be held in private jails.101 Still, nationwide, only a tiny portion of 
incarcerated individuals are held in private facilities.  
In terms of proportions of inmates in private facilities, Australia leads the world 
by far. In contrast to the United States, over twenty percent of all offenders in 
Australia are held in private facilities. Since the late 1990s in the state of Victoria, 
between forty and fifty percent of its adult offenders have been held in private 
facilities.102 In Queensland the comparable figure is around twenty-five percent.103 
In New South Wales, South Australia, and Western Australia, the figures are lower, 
but growing, especially in the latter.104  
Although the privatization movement started before the election of 
neoconservative governments in the United States and England, without doubt the 
new prison privatization took off with the rise of neoconservative governments in 
the 1970s with the election of Margaret Thatcher in England, Ronald Reagan in the 
United States, and Malcolm Fraser in Australia. With the rise of these governments, 
advocates of prison privatization finally had receptive audiences in high places, 
which allowed them to make significant inroads. Tellingly, however, privatization 
did not wither away when liberal governments regained power in the United States, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom. For the most part, prisons privatized under 
conservative governments have remained privatized, and although the clamor for 
privatization has declined and its rhetoric has dampened, privatization continues to 
expand.  
The reason for this is that privatization is driven by a number of factors other 
than neoconservative ideology. In a survey of worldwide developments in prison 
privatization, Australian law professor and corrections expert Richard Harding 
identified six factors that have fueled its growth, especially in the United States, 
England, and Australia: 
• exponential increases in incarcerated populations; 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. PAUL GUERINO, PAIGE M. HARRISON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
PRISONERS IN 2010 (2011), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
 100. For evidence why this is so, see id. at 9–11. State and county level reports of 
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Prisons.htm (last updated Jan. 6, 2014). 
 102. RICHARD HARDING, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIME & 
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Queensland 1989−2000, at 113 (June 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Griffith 
University) (on file with author). 
 104. Id. at 140. 
2014] THE UNCONVINCING CASE AGAINST PRIVATE PRISONS 1421 
 
• overcrowding and (in the United States) federal court intervention; 
• legal and political inhibitions upon capital expenditure by governments; 
• concern about recurrent costs; 
• growing impatience with the perceived obstructionism of organized labor; 
and 
• concern with regime improvement.105 
A version of this list, except the last item, is echoed by nearly all other scholars 
who have examined the rise of private prisons in the United States, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and continental Europe.106 
1. The United States 
In the United States the contemporary move to privatize adult facilities has been 
driven in large part by the dramatic growth in prison populations, rising costs, and 
problems with overcrowding. Problems are most acute in the southern states—
those with the fastest growing prison populations, the worst histories of prison 
abuse, the smallest tax bases, and in most instances the most backward public 
services.107 In many of these states, the entire prison systems have been in 
receivership because of catastrophic and systemic administrative failures, which 
have been compounded by exponential growth rates.108 In some of these states, 
privatization promised salvation. The situation was ripe for correctional 
entrepreneurs, and they descended in droves.109 They promised cheaper financing, 
faster and cheaper construction, cheaper provision of auxiliary services, and 
cheaper operating expenses.110 And of course, all of this was promised with better 
results. Private contractors made offers (often accompanied by substantial political 
donations to the right people) that were not refused.111 Privatization was seized 
upon by desperate politicians and harried corrections officials. They could give off 
some of their problems to private contractors. Hardly a recipe for responsible 
administration of prisons, public or private.112  
Because of these chaotic conditions under which privatization was embraced, 
there was (and as of this writing there continues to be) little sustained and serious 
analysis of prison privatization in the United States.113 There is no question that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 269 (2001). 
 106. See, e.g., RICHARD W. HARDING, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY, TRENDS & ISSUES IN 
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 109. See generally CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS AND PROS (1990); DAVID 
SHICHOR, PUNISHMENT FOR PROFIT: PRIVATE PRISONS/PUBLIC CONCERNS (1995). 
 110. SHICHOR, supra note 109, at 142–52. 
 111. Dolovich, supra note 20, at 455–62. 
 112. See LOGAN, supra note 109, at 7–12. 
 113. See Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Performance Measures, 63 
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privatization has been fraught with problems—back room deals, corruption, 
incompetence, careless planning, and the like. This, coupled with the history of the 
convict-lease system in the South (the region in the United States that has the 
largest number of private prisons114) in the late nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century, and the “plantation model” state corporation approach that 
operated in the South into the 1970s, has given ample ammunition to those who 
oppose private prisons.115 Private prisons adopted under such conditions can be 
opposed on any number of grounds. 
2. Australia 
The Australian experience is a study in contrasts. Prisons in Australia are only a 
fraction of the size of the mega-institutions in the United States. Prison populations 
are also much smaller, with around 30,000 prisoners in total.116 And despite 
Australia’s own “war on crime,” they have grown much more slowly. Australian 
officials have not faced the massive problems and the continuing crisis and sense of 
urgency that has been characteristic of American corrections since the 1970s. There 
are no judges issuing injunctions. No white papers demanding far-reaching and 
expensive reforms. No crisis in corrections leadership. No desperate effort to locate 
beds for prisoners. No cramming prisoners in three-tiered bunk beds in unventilated 
and unsupervised gymnasiums.  
But there are independent state inspectors of prisons whose integrity is 
unimpeachable, whose reports are thorough, and whose recommendations 
command attention.117 Furthermore, Australian state public-service institutions are 
better staffed and more professionalized than their counterparts in the United 
States, and especially in those American states in the South which rely most 
heavily on privatization.118  
Privatization in Australia was adopted first in Queensland (in 1990), New South 
Wales, and Victoria, the three most forward-looking states.119 Private prison 
contracts continue to be awarded. Most recently, the Wiri Prison in South 
Auckland, New Zealand, and the Ravenhall Prison in Victoria signed privatizing 
contracts.120 Furthermore, public officials, including elected officials, in Australia 
never abandoned the idea of rehabilitative and training programming within 
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prisons.121 Legislators did not campaign on “lock ’em up and throw away the keys” 
platforms. The Australian state parliamentary systems have permanent staffs in the 
ministries with a deep understanding of correctional matters and a commitment to 
progressive policies. Throughout the expansion of neoconservative governments in 
the 1970s and 1980s, they continued to advance ambitious progressive plans for 
education, vocational training, and rehabilitation.122 
In addition, in the Australian states in the 1970s and 1980s, plans were afoot to 
replace a number of outdated Victorian prisons.123 This development took place just 
as the wave of neoconservatism swept conservative governments into power in 
several states.124 They brought with them new ideas about deregulation and 
privatization, including the possibility of privatizing the new institutions that were 
on the drawing boards.  
Of course, prison administration is a challenging task. Like prison reformers 
everywhere, Australian corrections leaders have faced stiff resistance to their ideas 
from line staff, entrenched in their routines, preoccupied with safety and security, 
and ensconced in their positions by civil service and union protections.125 Time and 
time again, plans for reforms developed by progressive leaders were thwarted by 
safety and security concerns of entrenched line staffs.126 
So, when new conservative governments came into power and pressed for 
privatization of prisons, after an initial impulse to oppose the idea, progressive 
policy makers decided to turn the development to their advantage. Elected leaders 
may have been motivated primarily by cost savings, but progressive corrections 
officials saw this as an opportunity to construct new prisons, and organize and staff 
them with a new and more flexible workforce amenable to experimentation and 
reform. This combination of factors in Australia led to careful analysis of the 
possible benefits of private contractors. Better design could lead to better 
programming, it was argued, and corrections officials could insist that contractors 
implement much-needed reforms. Thus the sixth and final point in Richard 
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Harding’s list above—concern with regime improvement—was much more salient 
in the process of privatization in Australia than in the United States. It may not 
have been the initial impulse or the most important factor, but it played a role, 
especially for corrections leadership, when responding to the mandates to privatize. 
In assessing the experiment with privatization in Australia, Harding maintains that 
private prisons have succeeded to such an extent that they can provide the standard 
against which publicly run prisons should be judged.127 Recent empirical work on 
these issues suggests that in fact this is occurring in some Australian states.128  
III. CONTRASTING EXPERIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA 
Discussion about prison privatization in the United States is polarized. Private 
contractors and a handful of researchers they have engaged make claims of both 
efficiency (less costly) and effectiveness (lower recidivism rates, fewer suicides, 
less institutional violence, and the like).129 For reasons noted earlier, critics can 
easily challenge such claims and are correct often enough to call privatization into 
serious question. Opponents can point to scandals: suicides, escapes, inmate 
violence, understaffing, high staff turnover, and the like. Indeed, one professional 
association of state prison guards maintains an active electronic clipping service 
that reports on failings in private facilities, and distributes hundreds of such stories 
a month.130 Prisons are big operations, and private contractors operate in a 
competitive atmosphere,131 so it is not surprising that there are frequent stories of 
questionable lobbying practices, conflicts of interest, bribery, and the like. So, with 
good reason, privatization in the United States has come to smell of dirty politics 
and lax administration. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the states that 
rely most heavily on privatization are in the South, a region with a long history of 
plantation model prisons, chain gangs, prisoner lease systems, and forced work, as 
well as weak traditions in public administration and social welfare.  
Privatization in Australia has followed a decidedly different path. Although not 
without its blemishes, it has emerged more calmly and with greater deliberation. 
Fewer contracting companies are involved; prison facilities are tiny compared to 
American facilities. Inmate violence is far less of a problem than in the United 
States. State review and oversight is more thorough than is typical in the United 
States. Privatization was pioneered by the two most progressive and wealthiest 
Australian states.132 Private prisons are held to high standards and are closely 
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monitored. Australia’s greater success with prison privatization is not because there 
are no opponents or no scandals—there are both. Nor is it because there are so 
many proponents among correctional leaders. Few top officials are long-standing or 
passionate advocates of privatization. Almost everyone involved has a pragmatic 
view of privatization.133 Parliamentarians are concerned primarily with cost savings 
or at least the biggest bang for the buck, but reformers in correctional planning 
offices see opportunities to develop new and often more expensive treatment and 
rehabilitative programming. And they consistently have received the green light 
from these political leaders to pursue their reforms.134 In their tenders, corrections 
officials have developed increasingly long lists of expectations so that in many 
instances the hoped-for cost-savings of privatization have evaporated even before 
contracts were let.135 Private prison administration succeeds in Australia because 
Australian public administration is a success. It may be that the quality of privately 
provided public services in a jurisdiction is a function of the quality of public 
services and public administration more generally.136 
Upon what do I base my views? A near consensus among several dozen 
knowledgeable people both in and out of government whom I interviewed during 
winter 2013137 as well as a small but impressive body of evaluation research on the 
subject.138 Those I interviewed included ministers with corrections portfolios, 
commissioners of corrections, public prison wardens, private prison wardens, staff 
who have worked in both types of institutions, two independent inspectors of 
prisons, and a leading representative of the union for public prison guards, who 
admitted, “I can’t say it in the presence of the Commission and Minister, but the 
private prisons are better.”139  
Had the responses been mixed or inconsistent, I would have had to wait for 
more research for convincing answers to my questions. But what I found was a 
high degree of consistency and approval of private prisons, both in the views of the 
varied and mixed group of informed people with whom I spoke and in the findings 
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of the many reports and evaluations of private prisons which I read. Almost all 
signs pointed in the same direction, and to similar conclusions. Private prisons are 
successful in comparison to public prisons and in terms of meeting standards set by 
the states and various international organizations. Of course there are critics, but no 
hard-nosed, insistent critics.140 Those who did raise criticisms almost all pointed to 
the same one or two incidents, which with further elaboration appeared to be more 
about concern with discrimination against aboriginal peoples in the criminal 
process generally rather than distinctively private prisons—tragic accounts not 
distinctive to privatization.141 Whatever the case, each of the several indicators I 
examined pointed in the same direction and to the same conclusion.  
Almost everyone I spoke with about privatization thought that the new private 
prisons were on balance better than their public counterparts. Almost everyone 
agreed that they had more and better programming, and almost everyone agreed 
that their staffs were more flexible and receptive to new ideas. Of course prisons 
are prisons, and no one thinks the new private prisons are likely to produce 
dramatic improvements in the behavior of the inmates either while in custody or 
after release. Furthermore, new institutions quickly become old and fixed in their 
ways. But almost everyone I spoke with believed that private prisons were better, 
and among those who did not, most thought they were about the same. I heard none 
of the insistent condemnation followed by recitations of documented improprieties 
that is common among similarly knowledgeable informants in the United States 
and England. 
These impressions by informed observers were supported by the many reports 
and evaluations I read.142 A number of these studies assessed private prisons on a 
variety of dimensions. The private prisons came out looking good: they met the 
expectations of the state officials who had made the contracts and of national and 
international organizations that set prison standards.143 
Furthermore, the competitiveness of private contractors is real, certainly more 
than a theoretical possibility. Some prisons in Victoria, New South Wales, and 
Western Australia have changed operators at the end of their contract terms, and 
with improved results.144 Of course not all private prisons were spectacular 
successes—indeed, it is hard to imagine any prison being a spectacular success. In 
one instance, in Victoria, a private contractor was so ineffective that the state 
exercised its powers to resume control of the prison.145 In another instance in 
Queensland when a contract was about to expire and be rebid, the Department of 
Corrections itself responded to the tender its contracting division had released. The 
Department received the contract, and by all accounts the prison is now better than 
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it would have been had it been managed continuously by public officials.146 In 
short, there is ample evidence to support Harding’s claim that private prisons can 
generate higher standards of care, which, in turn, can be adopted as system-wide 
standards, and applied to public prisons. It appears that under at least some 
conditions, privatization can lead to significant improvements. Of course, both the 
Israeli High Court of Justice and Harel assert that such findings are irrelevant to 
their theory. We will return to this shortly.  
Because there have been questions about private prisons from the beginning, 
there is an increasing body of research assessing the operations of private prisons 
and comparing them with public prisons that has been conducted by academics, 
corrections officials, and independent researchers.147 Consistently—not every time 
and not always, but consistently—these studies reveal that private prisons are 
among the best prisons in Australia in terms of recidivism rates, inmate violence, 
rehabilitation programming, guards’ assessments of the quality of their work 
experience, inmate satisfaction, and the like.148 In all sorts of ways, private prisons 
come out ahead.  
During my interviews in Australia, one push-back question I received from time 
to time was something like, “Why are you so interested in private prisons?” Such 
questions suggested to me that private prisons in Australia are now so much a part 
of the landscape that questioning their existence was a bit surprising. It was as if a 
foreign observer were to come to the United States and inquire of educators, “Why 
private schools?” or of doctors, “Why private hospitals?” Although these are 
perfectly reasonable questions, respondents still might have a difficult time 
formulating coherent responses. One reason is that they are so taken for granted 
that we generally do not think about reasons for them, and thus would find 
skeptical questions about them odd if not off-putting. Certainly Australia’s private 
prisons are not celebrated as great successes, but then what prison—public or 
private—ever has been? Still, the prevailing question among those involved in the 
field of corrections is not whether to, but how best to privatize. 
There are any number of factors that may account for the normalization of 
private prisons in Australia in contrast to the continuing storm of controversy over 
private prisons in the United States. As suggested earlier, the per capita prison 
population is low by U.S. figures.149 Levels of inmate violence are lower and less 
severe.150 Australian prisons are only a small fraction of the size of U.S. prisons; 
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large Australian prisons hold five or six hundred inmates, in contrast to many 
American prisons which house several thousand inmates.151 In Australia staff move 
back and forth between private and public prisons; except for the recruitment of 
wardens from among retired public prison officials, staff do not move in the United 
States.152 In Australia private prisons are held to the same standard of care as public 
prisons and closely monitored—probably more closely monitored for violations 
than public prisons. Monitoring is meaningful; violations are detected, changes are 
made.153 Staff in private prisons are represented by unions, and while these unions 
are not as powerful as the unions for the public employees, they are bona fide 
unions that provide meaningful collective benefits.154 This is not to say that private 
prisons in Australia do not have their share of problems with staffs, inmate 
aggressiveness, contraband, and the like, but only to say they are structured to offer 
more programming and services, organized to try to provide these additional 
benefits, and subjected to oversight and review to try to secure them. And they are 
familiar with enhanced expectations about what public prisons can do.155 
Given the volumes that have been written about the sad history and continuing 
state of affairs of American prisons, both public and private, it is perhaps not 
surprising that opponents of private prisons would seize upon some of this work in 
fashioning a case against private prisons (though one might reasonably ask, “Why, 
given two hundred years of near constant failure of publicly administered prisons, 
aren’t you interested in experimenting with private prisons?”). Still, it is not 
difficult on any number of grounds to make a case against private prisons in the 
United States. However, the Australian experience suggests the need to pause and 
reflect. If our intuitions are formed by our experiences, it may be that we should 
expand our horizons and reflect on experiences in Australia. Also, no doubt 
different cultures have different and deep understandings of the divide between 
public and private. As recent scholarship has confirmed, the private/public divide is 
infinitely plastic.156 All this suggests that differences in history, experience, and 
effectiveness may lead to different conclusions about the legitimate private/public 
boundary with respect to prisons and any number of other state-mandated services 
such as education, parks, highways, health care, organ transplants, and the like. 
Certainly in Australia, private prisons are now part of the landscape, like 
eucalyptus trees and kangaroos.  
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IV. OTHER FORMS OF DELEGATED CORRECTIONAL  
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
The taken-for-granted acceptance of prison privatization in Australia led me to 
look beyond private prisons to other related institutions, including private facilities 
for juveniles, inter-jurisdictional prison transfer compacts, and international prison 
transfer treaties. But these, too, are taken-for-granted institutions that seem to run 
counter to the theory against privatization. They have aroused no substantial 
interest among theorists opposed to delegating state functions to third parties. 
Indeed, I know of no sustained discussion by opponents of privatization that has 
addressed them. Below, I briefly address each of these practices, emphasizing how 
they seem to violate core principles of the state monopoly theory of prison 
management discussed above but nevertheless do not appear to violate our 
intuitions or our sense of dignity. I then draw on them to question the state 
monopoly theory.  
A. Private Juvenile Facilities 
Opponents of corrections privatization have focused exclusively on adult 
corrections, and wholly ignored private facilities for juveniles. This is strange, 
since in the United States only a small proportion of adults are held in private 
institutions but well over one-half of all juveniles are held in for-profit and 
nonprofit institutions. As of 2012, over thirty percent of all juveniles in custodial 
institutions are held in some form of private facility, and in several states the figure 
is close to one hundred percent.157  
Of course there are differences between juvenile and adult facilities. Many 
juvenile facilities are minimum-security institutions or are open institutions, and 
few are staffed by gun-carrying officers.158 Juvenile facilities emphasize education, 
treatment, and rehabilitation.159 Most are small, at least compared to adult prisons; 
typically they house from a dozen to fifty or so, and few hold over two or three 
hundred.160 In addition, many juvenile facilities are run by nonprofit organizations 
rather than for-profit contractors.161 Furthermore, in a formal and important sense, 
juveniles in custody are not imprisoned or being punished. They have been 
“adjudicated” delinquent and placed in custody for their own well-being.162 The list 
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of other important differences between juvenile and adult offenders and institutions 
could be expanded indefinitely. 
Still, in light of the theory against privatization, such differences would seem to 
be irrelevant.163 Both adults and juveniles in private facilities are confined against 
their wills and must submit to authority that is not an “instrumentality” of the state. 
Programming for juveniles involves a range of invasive activities. In fact, juveniles 
are subject to more discretionary treatment than adults in more regimented prisons. 
Furthermore, privatization opponents might reasonably argue that because of their 
vulnerability, young people in custody require more state protection and 
involvement than adult inmates—not less. Thus a powerful case can be made that it 
is even more important that juvenile detention should fall within the scope of the 
theory against privatization.  
Despite this, opponents of privatization have not addressed private juvenile 
facilities in theoretical terms at all. Neither the Israeli Supreme Court’s three 
hundred pages of opinions nor the dozens of pages of articles by Harel and 
colleagues, nor any other theoretical discussions opposing prison privatization that 
I have read, even mentions juvenile facilities, let alone works through the state 
monopoly theory’s implications for them.164 So how should we view juvenile 
facilities in light of the theory that covers but nevertheless ignores them?  
Certainly private juvenile facilities generate their share of scandals. In the late 
2000s, two judges in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, were removed from office and 
convicted for receiving kickbacks from the operator of a private facility to whom 
they sent kids in droves.165 But then there are plenty of scandals about public 
juvenile institutions, perhaps even at a higher rate. What is most striking in light of 
our concerns here, however, is the total lack of attention from privatization 
opponents to the widespread involvement of private contractors in juvenile 
corrections and the blank looks I got when I raised the issue of privatization with 
juvenile justice officials, juvenile justice experts, and opponents of privatizations. 
Private juvenile facilities appear to be so well institutionalized that juvenile justice 
officials don’t pause to question the idea (though they certainly think “internally” 
about them constantly), and they have simply not been on the radar of theorists 
against privatization. They are, theoretically speaking, invisible.  
Perhaps they are invisible for good reason. Perhaps they perform satisfactorily, 
and what little we know about them informs our intuitions that they can provide 
benefits not so easily replicated in state-run institutions such as small size, 
home-like settings, greater flexibility, less coercive environments, and more 
treatment and rehabilitative programming. Certainly this has been conventional 
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wisdom about community corrections among juvenile justice professionals for the 
past sixty years or so.166 
One of the great triumphs in the lore of contemporary American juvenile 
corrections took place in 1971. In one fell swoop over the Christmas holidays, the 
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Jerome Miller, 
dramatically removed every kid from that state’s juvenile “training schools.”167 He 
collected the kids in yellow school buses, and deposited them in not-yet-opened 
dorms on the state university campus in Amherst. Over the course of the next few 
months, he found placements for virtually all of them. His actions were a desperate 
act of the governor who had appointed him. Faced with mounting evidence of 
barbaric conditions in the state-run training schools and an implacable staff that 
undermined every effort at reform, the governor had appointed Miller to devise and 
carry out a bold plan. By all accounts the change was a stunning achievement. It 
has become the stuff of legend and has paved the way for a new beginning in 
American juvenile corrections.168 
This story of triumphant removal is an oft-told tale.169 What is not so well 
known is its aftermath. Miller eventually placed most of the kids in private 
for-profit and nonprofit facilities—group homes, foster family-like settings, and 
other types of small facilities. This had unanticipated consequences that some 
might not like, but there is little doubt that the new arrangements were—and 
forty-five years later remain—far superior to the state training schools they 
replaced,170 first in Massachusetts and then, as the movement for community 
corrections gained strength, in other states.  
Here too, low visibility of the vast network of privately run juvenile facilities 
and the cult-like response to Miller (I confess, I’m a fan) seem to suggest that our 
intuitions about who can successfully administer juvenile institutions may include 
private contractors as well as public agencies. Perhaps juveniles are different, but if 
anything, the theory against privatization should apply even more strongly to more 
vulnerable children who are subjected to more discretionary treatment. However, 
our now-long-standing acceptance of privately run juvenile facilities suggests that 
our intuitions about dealing with delinquency include the embrace of private 
institutions. Indeed, it is now the new conventional wisdom that small-scale 
housing units with family-like and less threatening forms of control are preferable 
to larger institutions, and it is generally conceded that private operators are more 
able to administer such facilities. This is not only true for the United States but for 
juvenile institutions around the world, including Israel.171 Despite this, the justices 
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on the high court spent three hundred pages assessing the implications of private 
facilities for adults, but did not have a word to say about that country’s private 
facilities for juveniles. One wonders why the complaints about private prisons for 
adults have not spilled over to juvenile facilities where private facilities are the 
overwhelming norm. The answer, I believe, is the taken-for-granted acceptance of 
smaller, flexible private arrangements for juveniles, and the widespread belief that 
they are relatively successful and superior to most public facilities.  
B. Jurisdictional Overlaps 
The rejectionist theory of privatization reviewed above dwells on the evils of 
for-profit corporations, but ultimately both the Israeli court’s and Professor Harel 
and colleagues’ versions of the theory rest on the belief that only a unitary 
sovereign state that prescribes punishment has the moral authority to administer it. 
That is, in order to maintain the bond between offender and state, only the state that 
has created the crime and convicted and sentenced the offender possesses the moral 
authority to administer punishments to that offender. This raises issues far beyond 
privatization. 
C. Interjurisdiction Compacts 
Consider a hypothetical case: A person is duly tried and convicted of a crime in 
one jurisdiction and is sentenced to prison in that jurisdiction. But it happens that 
the prison is some distance from that offender’s home and family in another state. 
So after a successful request authorized under well-institutionalized interstate 
compacts, the prisoner is relocated to a prison in his home state nearer to his 
family.  
In the United States, this arrangement is institutionalized between a number of 
states.172 Keep in mind that in the United States each state has its own criminal 
laws, system for administering criminal justice, and prison system. These are 
regarded as core features of semi-sovereign states in the American federal system. 
By contrast, Canada, although a federal system, has a single, national criminal 
system (actually, responsibility is shared with the provinces under the 1867 
Constitution, but the provinces have very limited responsibility).173 
There are also variations on this interjurisdiction arrangement. Foreign nationals 
convicted in one country are at times relocated to serve their prison terms in their 
home countries.174 This is fraught with all sorts of difficulties, and the international 
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agreements that permit it are detailed and circumscribed.175 Still, at times these 
arrangements work, and offenders can be sent to their home countries so they can 
be near their families, speak their native language, and eat their native food. When 
this works, everyone but the Grinch celebrates.  
Perhaps theory should instruct us otherwise, but my intuition leads me—and I 
suspect most of those reading this Essay—to accept such arrangements as sensible 
and humane, and to believe that they do not violate the dignity of offenders or 
undermine the moral authority of the punishing state. Indeed, such arrangements 
are likely to be viewed as enhancing the dignity of prisoners and the moral stature 
of the participating states. This is smart, practical, and sensitive correctional 
administration, as well as exemplary public policy. Of course, one can easily 
imagine how it could be abused—sending California prisoners who are Mexican 
nationals to dismal prisons in Mexico, or inmates in Iowa prisons to Alabama, for 
example—but it is a good idea if administered with care, particularly if inmates 
themselves approve of the transfers.  
D. Interjurisdiction Transfers 
Variations on this theme abound. In the United States, jails in some jurisdictions 
are heavily impacted, and inmates—both those awaiting trial and those serving 
misdemeanor sentences—are often sent out of state to be held in custody. Big cities 
often contract with any number of jails around the state and the country. 
Conversely, smaller counties in the United States often contract with larger 
counties to provide jail space, sometimes within the same state and sometimes 
across state lines. Occasionally smaller counties build oversized jails in order to 
contract with larger counties with crowded jails to hold some of their inmates at a 
profit. All of this can lead, and certainly has led, to conflicts of interest, corruption, 
and hardships for inmates.176 But it can also be effective and efficient public 
administration in a hyperdecentralized country. Similarly, at times states may 
contract with other states for space in their prisons, and then send their prisoners 
out of state. This too can lead to abuses. Sending ethnic Samoan prisoners from 
Hawaii to prisons in New Mexico, for example, approaches abuse.177 But at times 
interjurisdiction transfers might help both New Hampshire and Vermont as well as 
prison inmates and their families.178 There are still other issues that reach beyond 
the scope of this Essay. When offenders are sentenced by an international criminal 
court, where should they serve their prison terms? Is it proper for the U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service to house detainees on a contract basis in a 
state prison or local jail?  
These issues may loom larger in the United States than other countries, owing to 
its vast size and intense localism. But the state monopoly theory of prison 
administration does not convince me that all interjurisdictional arrangements 
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should be barred as a matter of principle. The theory may sound a useful warning, 
but it is not dispositive of the issue.  
Society’s ready acceptance of interjurisdictional compacts and transfers may be 
based upon the fact that safeguards are built into the best of them and that many of 
them are voluntary. Of course there may be conditions where adequate precautions 
are not taken, and the arrangement raises serious questions. Yet neither safeguards 
nor voluntariness satisfy the state monopoly theory. Certainly it would make a 
mockery of the theory on its own terms if states could simply opt out of their duties 
by obtaining inmate waivers. The theory, after all, emphatically rejects any 
institution other than the sanctioning state to administer punishments. The theory 
rests on the nature of the obligation of the sentencing state, not the offender’s 
wishes. It holds that only the state that imposes the punishment can administer that 
punishment. No other institution! Neither the standard of care, nor the quality of 
care, nor the assumption by the state for full responsibility, nor voluntariness can 
undo this obligation. As long as that entity that administers the punishment is not 
an instrumentality of the state that prescribed the punishment, the arrangement is 
unacceptable. The reciprocal bond between the punished and the punisher is 
broken. At least that is what the theory asserts. It is rigidly statist.179  
Still, with respect to interjurisdictional compacts, defense attorneys, judges, 
human rights workers, and civil liberties advocates of all sorts who are sensitive to 
loss of dignity and liberty celebrate when they hear of such arrangements, and are 
at the forefront in the campaign for more such opportunities. Perhaps their 
sensibilities, and hence their intuitions, are under-developed. I tend to think that 
their intuitions are correct and the practices justifiable, and that it is the theory that 
is wrong.  
CONCLUSION 
A categorical principle imposing on states the duty to respect the dignity and 
minimize the deprivation of liberty of criminal offenders under its authority has 
obvious appeal. Attaching it to a flat prohibition that does not allow delegation of 
the administration of punishments to third parties under any circumstances may 
also appear to be compelling. It gives us clear and unambiguous instruction as to 
how to construct one of society’s most fundamental institutions and deals with one 
of its most vulnerable groups. But our intuitions can vary widely and invariably are 
culturally shaped, and unexpected facts can emerge that complicate our intuitions. 
Variable circumstances appear that lead us to want to make distinctions that a 
categorical theory disallows. After reflection on the history of punishment, a brief 
consideration of the contested theories of sovereignty, a grounded tour of some 
ignored forms of privatization in both adult and juvenile institutions, and a review 
of some other long-standing and well-regarded arrangements for administering 
punishments, the idea of a general theory against privatization begins to lose some 
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of its appeal. Furthermore, as I have shown, the anti-privatization theory is in fact a 
state monopoly theory, and an unnecessarily restrictive theory at that. It does not 
even allow many arrangements that are widely regarded as sensible and dignity 
enhancing, or even exemplary, by human-rights groups. It might be that a highly 
contextualized theory that applies under certain conditions makes sense, but a 
general and categorical theory that admits to no exceptions, such as the one 
proffered by the Israeli High Court of Justice and by Professor Harel and 
colleagues, leads to too many unpalatable conclusions.  
Of course a rejection of such a sweeping statist theory need not lead to an 
enthusiastic embrace of private prisons. On various policy grounds, many private 
prisons in the United States and England do not pass with flying colors, if any of 
them pass at all. But in Australia, at least some of them seem to pass the intuition 
test. Certainly the experience in that highly developed liberal democracy does not 
lead to any pervasive sense of abuse. Similarly, private juvenile facilities in a great 
many places in the United States and elsewhere are probably better on balance than 
public adult facilities and most of their public juvenile counterparts. It is frankly 
difficult to imagine any government providing in its own institutions the wide array 
of arrangements commonly available to juveniles throughout the world, including 
the United States, Australia, and Israel. Furthermore, those interjurisdictional 
compacts for inmate transfers I am familiar with are widely praised, and there is 
constant pressure from the good guys to expand them. This is not to deny that some 
of these arrangements are no doubt failures on just about any criteria we can 
imagine.  
So, the picture is mixed. The theory examined here raises a good many 
important considerations—beware of private corporations putting profits before 
people, beware of lack of oversight and clear operating standards, and the like. But 
the range of experiences with private prisons and non-sanctioning state actors 
suggests that there are enough significant exceptions to call the theory into serious 
question. Upon reflection, I suspect that this is what most informed observers 
would conclude.  
Admittedly, it is possible that those of us who hold this view are all like Don 
Herzog’s “happy slaves,” blissfully unaware of the indignities of the various 
institutional arrangements to which we have consented.180 (Think of the fifty 
percent of the adult offenders in Victoria in private prisons, the vast numbers of 
juvenile offenders in non-state run facilities, or the Wisconsin offender housed in a 
Minnesota prison.) Because these arrangements are so pervasive in contemporary 
American life, we may simply fail to see their illegitimacy in the same way that 
Marx found that the working class was confounded and immobilized by false 
consciousness.181  
If so, a powerful theory of state-only(!) administered sanctions, such as the one 
examined here, should rouse us to slough off our chains. But as I continue to grasp 
for the intuitive truths behind the theoretical edifice, I confess they do not lead me 
to rip off my blinders. But I may remain lost in the fog of false consciousness. 
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Or am I? In the midst of an intense conflict during the Vietnam War, a Marine 
Corps colonel was said to have observed, “We must destroy the village in order to 
save it.” Must we do something of the same for some of our custodial institutions? 
Is the experiment in the majority of Australian states so large and pervasive a fraud 
that it has become the new normal without anyone realizing the moral havoc it 
wreaks? Once relocated in private placements, were Jerome Miller’s kids subjected 
to a diminished increment of dignity and liberty? Are the by-now taken for granted 
fifty-plus percent of juvenile offenders in the United States currently housed in 
private, community-based facilities so degrading that we should take emergency 
measures to relocate them into public facilities—“scaling the wall” in the opposite 
direction?182 Should the resident of St. Paul who was sentenced for a crime 
committed in Dresser, Wisconsin, and now serving his time in Stillwater, 
Minnesota, fifteen miles from his wife and children, be returned to the Wisconsin 
State Prison in Baraboo, two hundred miles from his family?  
The theory reviewed in this chapter would appear to respond to these questions 
in a forceful affirmative. But my answer is a less forceful, “no,” and a follow up 
qualification, “It all depends.” Upon what does it depend? I am unable to draw up a 
comprehensive list. But certainly, it does not turn on even more rigorous abstract 
theorizing that seeks even greater universality. It may require more unpacking in 
order to show me the error of my own intuitions. But I don’t think so. I’m familiar 
with the facts. I have done due diligence. The examples I have rehearsed above are 
not farfetched, and oddball exceptions that can easily be dismissed. They represent 
major institutional arrangements that affect a huge portion of the custodial 
population in the United States, England, Australia, Israel, and the elsewhere. They 
cannot be dismissed.  
It is not that I reject theorizing. The theory reviewed here raises obvious and 
important issues; and, if properly reworked and modestly presented, might even 
establish strong presumptions against privatization. But it does not provide a 
convincing categorical answer to the question it asks. I think the matter requires 
more facts, more history, more experience, more nuance, more appreciation for the 
ways of the modern administrative state, more humility, and more concrete concern 
with the conditions in which institutionalized persons of all types exist. In short, it 
requires more wisdom.  
To my mind, the response to the question, “Should we house prisoners in 
non-state run facilities?” must be: “It all depends.” This is hardly a satisfactory 
answer, but it may be the first step toward wisdom on this complicated subject.  
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